Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife : Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Record no. 2841)
| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 02051nam a22002057a 4500 |
| 082 00 - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER | |
| Classification number | 959.504 |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--AUTHOR NAME | |
| Personal name | Nagl, John A. |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife : Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam |
| Statement of responsibility | John A. Nagl |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) | |
| Place of publication | Rawalpindi |
| Name of publisher | Army Publishing House |
| Year of publication | 2012 |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION | |
| Number of Pages | xxix,249 Pages |
| Other physical details | 24x16 cm |
| -- | HB |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | Originally published: Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Westport, Conn. : Praeger, 2002. |
| 505 ## - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE | |
| Formatted contents note | Includes Bibliography and Index. |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc | Invariably, armies are accused of preparing to fight the previous war. In Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl?a veteran of both Operation Desert Storm and the current conflict in Iraq?considers the now-crucial question of how armies adapt to changing circumstances during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared. Through the use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both engagements, Nagl compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960 with what developed in the Vietnam War from 1950 to 1975. In examining these two events, Nagl?the subject of a recent New York Times Magazine cover story by Peter Maass?argues that organizational culture is key to the ability to learn from unanticipated conditions, a variable which explains why the British army successfully conducted counterinsurgency in Malaya but why the American army failed to do so in Vietnam, treating the war instead as a conventional conflict. Nagl concludes that the British army, because of its role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics created by its history and national culture, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. |
| 650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM | |
| Topical Term | Counterinsurgency |
| 650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM | |
| Topical Term | Vietnam War, 1961-1975 |
| 650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM | |
| Topical Term | Counterinsurgency |
| 650 #7 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM | |
| Topical Term | Counterinsurgency. |
| 650 #7 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM | |
| Topical Term | Underground movements, War. |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Books |
| Withdrawn status | Lost status | Permanent Location | Current Location | Shelving location | Date acquired | Source of acquisition | Full call number | Accession Number | Koha item type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Garrison Public Library Multan | Garrison Public Library Multan | General Stacks | 2016-12-05 | MSL | 959.504 N147L 2012 | 17887 | Books |